Association's first Code of Ethics, adopted in 1847, deemed it "derogatory to professional character" for a physician to hold a patent. 7 The absolute ban on patenting was softened only slightly in 1940, when it was revised to state that it was "unprofessional to receive remuneration from patents or copyrights on surgical instruments, appliances, medicines, foods, methods or procedures." 8 Only in 1955 was the ethical principle revised to permit physicians to patent "surgical instruments, appliances, and medicines" as long as the receipt of remuneration did not "retard[] or inhibit[] research or restrict[] the benefits derivable therefrom." 9 The ban on patenting medical procedures remained in place, though physicians were permitted to obtain copyrights associated with them. 10 In 1957, the AMA overhauled and shortened its
Principles of Ethics, removing explicit reference to patenting. The 1955 approach to patenting was, however, incorporated by reference as part of a compilation of sections said to be "included within the spirit and intent of the language of the 1957 edition." 11 A later ethical opinion adopted sometime before 1977 took an even more positive view of patents on medical instruments: "A physician may patent a surgical or diagnostic instrument he or she has discovered or developed. The laws governing patents are based on the sound doctrine that one is entitled to protect one's discovery." 12 There was no such evolution in the AMA's opinions on medical procedures, however. Instead, a 1984 ethics opinion emphasized that, like medical knowledge, skills and techniques were not to be withheld from the community for reasons of personal gain. 13 Until the middle of the twentieth century, the few judicial and patent office opinions involving medical procedure patents were in line with the medical profession's view. Scherer expressly overruled Brinkerhoff, allowing a claim to a method of "injecting fluids into the human body" by a pressure jet. 17 From that point on, medical procedure patents were available in principle, though they seem to have been rare (or at least not salient to physicians) during the next few decades. 18 The seeds of controversy over medical procedure patents began to be sown in the 1980s. At that time, optimism about the potential for patents to facilitate medical advances, particularly through the newly emerging field of biotechnology, was high. The Bayh-Dole Act 19 reflected an assumption that patents would facilitate the commercialization of the neglected fruits of academic research, particularly in the biomedical sciences. The Supreme Court's approval of the patenting of living organisms in Diamond v. Chakrabarty 20 gave the green light to biotechnology patenting. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals was established in 1982, centralizing patent appeals in a single forum, largely because of Congress's sense that courts were unfriendly to patenting. 21 The pro-patent mood continued throughout the 1990s when, for example, the 1994 WTO-based TRIPS Agreement established robust minimum requirements for intellectual property protection internationally 22 and the Federal Circuit expanded patentable subject matter to the point that any method producing a "useful, concrete, and tangible" result was deemed patentable. 23 
II. The Story of Pallin v. Singer
Given the generally pro-patent mood of the time and the fact that medical device patenting by physicians had become commonplace, it is perhaps unsurprising that in 1990, when our story begins, Dr. Samuel Pallin was tempted to catch the wave by patenting an improvement in cataract surgery technique. His attempt to enforce that patent against Dr. Jack Singer unleashed the storm of physician opposition to medical procedure patents that led Congress to enact § 287(c).
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A. Sutureless Cataract Surgery
Human beings have suffered from, and treated, cataracts (opacity of the optic lens) for millennia. 25 Treatment methods have involved breaking up the clouded lens, pushing it away from the line of vision ("couching") and removing the lens entirely. During the early twentieth century, lens removal methods improved greatly, yet removal left patients with better, but still poor vision. In the 1940s, physician Harold Ridley revolutionized treatment by developing the intraocular lens -an artificial replacement lens permanently implanted in the eye. When improved removal methods permitted smaller incisions, flexible lenses, which could be folded for insertion, were developed.
Surgeons also sought to minimize trauma to their patients' eyes by improving their incision techniques. By 1989, cutting-edge surgeons used a "scleral tunnel" technique. The lens of the eye sits behind an outer layer consisting of three parts: the sclera, or "white" of the eye; the cornea, or outer lens; and the limbus, a ring of tissue connecting the cornea and sclera. An "anterior chamber" lies between the cornea and inner lens. In the scleral tunnel technique, the surgeon would make an incision partway through the sclera at some distance from the cornea, "tunnel" through the sclera to reach the anterior chamber, remove the defective natural lens and insert the artificial replacement through the tunnel, and suture the wound. Sutures were problematic, however, because they could induce astigmatism as the wound healed. In the late 1980s, Dr. John Shepherd introduced a technique for closing the wound with a single, loose stitch, thus avoiding some of the problems previously caused by suturing. Some, including the well-known Florida ophthalmologist James Gills, began to suggest the possibility of sutureless surgery. wherein portions of said incision extend away from said approximate central point and extend laterally away from the curvature of said limbus.
7. The method of claim 1 further including making an incision having a curvilinear configuration.
Though there was, as we have seen, no lack of relevant professional literature about cataract surgery, the patent examiner considered only seven prior art references, each of which was a patent directed to a device for ophthalmic surgery Recall that, by this time, the AMA no longer had a specific ethical prohibition against medical procedure patenting on the books, though the longstanding prohibition incorporated by reference into the Principles of Medical Ethics in 1957 had never been challenged. The historical trend was toward greater acceptance of physician patenting, as reflected in the rosy view that "laws governing patents are based on the sound doctrine that one is entitled to protect one's discovery" expressed in the AMA ethics opinion on device patenting. In light of the generally pro-patent mood of the times, physician acquiescence in medical procedure patenting might have seemed an inevitable next step. Instead, Singer's call for support galvanized the medical community and catalyzed the political movement against medical procedure patenting that resulted in 35 U.S.C. § 287(c).
In April 1994 Singer received a standing ovation after giving an impassioned speech entitled "Free Exchange of Surgical Knowledge" at a meeting of the American Society of Ocular Surgeons (ASOS). 48 One of Pallin's attorneys, who had attended the speech, immediately sent
Singer a settlement offer that was considerably more conciliatory than earlier offers:
ecognizing Dr. Singer's contributions in promoting the incision and its benefits," it proposed a "single one time payment of $5,000" and had "no objections to Dr. Singer continuing to promote the frown incision in whatever way he likes." Noting that Singer's speech made clear that his "fundamental objection is not to the Pallin patent alone, but to the present availability of method patents on surgical techniques," the letter argued that, while Singer had a right to work for legal reform, he had "unearthed no proof of invalidity [of Pallin's claims] sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity."
Unappeased, Singer pressed Pallin to disclaim his patent and to agree not to enforce it against other ophthalmologists. The response of Pallin's attorney nicely illustrates the culture clash between the patent system's emphasis on individual entitlements and the medical profession's community-based approach to disseminating and rewarding procedure innovation:
What we do with the patent in the future with respect to others who are not defendants in this law suit is our business and has no proper part in any settlement. However, there is no reason to disclaim the patent and we will not do so. The patent is valid and infringed and you have provided no evidence to the contrary. While Pallin's motivations for filing his patent application remain murky, there is little doubt that his later turn to enforcement was driven by discontent with the community's recognition of his contributions. When the patent issued in January 1992, Pallin did not run out to seek royalties. Instead, he sought community recognition by attempting to donate the patent first to the ASCRS and then to the American Academy of Ophthalmology (AAO). 58 Only after these attempts to deploy the patent to gain recognition from the community were rejected did Pallin begin to demand royalty payments. As Pallin perceived things: "The degree of resistance I encountered when I attempted to share my work with the profession at large was astounding.
The arrogance with which my work was dismissed by individuals whom I had held in high regard was shocking."
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Besides justifying his resort to patent enforcement by alleging a failure of the community's reward system, Pallin also argued repeatedly that his use of his patent was an appropriate extension of community norms. Thus, an April 20 1994 settlement offer portrayed Pallin's patent enforcement strategy as tempered by the sharing norms of the physician community:
Dr. Pallin has stated on a number of occasions that he would never seek an injunction or an unreasonable royalty from a surgeon or anyone else so you and Dr. Singer may be assured that no one will be stopped from using this incision in the future. At the most they will be asked to pay a small royalty. together. Pallin also deferred to community reputational norms by offering to credit Singer for his contributions to "popularizing the frown incision."
Pallin also presented himself as a concerned community member seeking revision of the antipatenting norm in light of changed circumstances. Thus, the June 1994 settlement letter emphasized that Pallin strongly believed that he was "doing the right thing" and "pioneering the way for others to follow." It also asserted that the USPTO Official Gazette reflected increasing numbers of procedure patents in ophthalmology and other surgical specialties so that inventors were "watching this debate." Pallin also acknowledged Singer's "goals of embracing a political debate within the profession" and offered to debate him at a professional meeting. Similarly, in a debate with Singer published in a July 1994 AAO newsletter, 62 Pallin argued that the journal publication process was "too easily corrupted by politics and special interests" and that patents therefore might sometimes be the only way for the true inventor to be recognized. For his part, Singer distinguished medical procedures from devices and drugs, arguing that procedure innovations are incentivized by "the foundation of good medical practice" and generally do not require substantial financial investments that must be recouped through patents. Pallin contended that the growth of managed care would shrink physicians' intrinsic incentives to invent new procedures, which would have to be replaced by the "recognition and small profit" available from patenting. He also disputed Singer's distinction between devices and procedures, arguing that both device and procedure patents should be ethically acceptable as long as royalties were not too expensive (and thus, by implication, did not interfere with the sharing norm).
In the end, the 1994 settlement negotiations failed for reasons that make sense in light of the ongoing battle over the norms of the physician community. Though Pallin eventually went so far as to offer the defendants a royalty-free license, 63 on top of the concessions discussed above, and even attempted to grant such a license unilaterally, Singer refused to settle. 64 Singer demanded nothing less than dedication of the patent to the public or something of equivalent effect, 65 while
Pallin was equally adamant that he would not give up his patent. It was time for the court to weigh in.
D. Pallin v. Singer in Court
In October 1994, Singer moved for summary judgment of noninfringement and of invalidity in light of the work of Gills, Singer, and McFarland. 66 The summary judgment motion moved the focus from the terrain of community norms and ethics back to the technical patent law issues, at least temporarily. The arguments centered on whether the preamble term "substantially selfsealing" limited the claim and on how that term and the "wherein" clause describing the incision shape should be construed. On May 1, 1995, the court denied the motion, without resolving any of the claim construction issues, holding that "complex factual disputes" existed in the case.
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At that point, it seemed that the case was on track for trial. Fate intervened, however. Judge Franklin Billings, who had been presiding over the case, had taken senior status in September 1994. In September 1995, he reassigned his pending cases, including Pallin v. Singer, to newly appointed Judge William Sessions. Singer's attorneys asked the new judge to resolve the claim construction issues and grant summary judgment in light of intervening changes in the law. 68 Judge Sessions held the requested hearing on March 26, 1996. 69 The hearing must not have gone well for Pallin. Two days later, the court issued a Consent Order declaring the patent claims invalid and noninfringed and ordering Pallin not to make any further enforcement attempts. 70 The Pallin v. Singer litigation thus ended, having resulted in no pathbreaking ruling on the patentability of medical procedures (or anything else, for that matter).
The result was widely reported in the medical and mainstream media as a defeat for medical procedure patenting. 71 Pallin did not acknowledge defeat, stating that "My goal from the beginning of this controversy and in this litigation was to demand and achieve recognition for a contribution, which I made to the profession in early 1990. . . . I am satisfied this goal has now been achieved." 72 He also claimed a moral victory, in that his case had made physicians aware that medical procedures are patentable, 73 and continued to defend medical procedure patenting.
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Pallin was wrong, however. Singer's view had prevailed in the court of physician community opinion and the norm against medical procedure patenting had, if anything, been reinforced. Indeed, Singer's 1994 speech to the ASOS had ignited an assault on medical procedure patents in the halls of Congress, which also came to a head in 1996.
III. Negotiating the Boundary Between Physician Innovation Norms and the Patent System
A. The Physician Movement Against Medical Procedure Patents
Even before Singer's ASOS speech, Pallin's attempt to enforce his patent seems not to have gone over well with his fellow eye surgeons. In a March 15, 1994 interview, for example, Michael McFarland dismissed the idea that patents could replace or supplement the medical community's assessment of credit by documenting "originality." He explained that "traditionally in ophthalmology we've always documented innovation of a new procedure, technique or piece of equipment through our literature, so that will continue to be the way that we document who does what first." He also rejected the notion that patent licenses and royalties could be means to share innovations with fellow surgeons. To McFarland, collecting royalties from another physician was "[u]ndoable, if not unthinkable":
It's hard for me to conceptualize why anybody would want to bring this whole royalty scheme into ophthalmology and to introduce the legalities involved and to bring lawyers into the picture and file lawsuits against our colleagues . . . . We ought to get back to trying to figure out better ways to fix folks and to share that with our colleagues for the benefit of the patients.
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Singer's ASOS meeting speech painted medical procedure patenting as a threat to medical community sharing norms:
An insidious virus has been threatening to destroy the foundation of good medical care in the United States since 1954. The virus is method patents for medical and surgical procedures. If allowed to proliferate this will effectively block the timeless way of sharing medical and surgical knowledge, and perhaps more importantly will inhibit the interdependent free exchange of information that is the foundation of good medical care. Other victims of medical and surgical method patents include physician autonomy, the doctor-patient relationship, openness in medical research, and free exchange of medical and surgical knowledge. 76 During the spring of 1994, following Singer's letters and speech, the physician movement to oppose medical procedure patenting took on a life of its own, first among ophthalmologists and then throughout the broader medical community. 77 Dr. Herve Byron, an intraocular lens pioneer, fanned the flames of community outrage in a colorfully written OSN column in June 1994. Byron depicted the Pallin v. Singer case as a "monumental battle," emphasizing that its "ultimate impact" should be determined on ethical, rather than legal, grounds. 78 He described
Singer as "the beleaguered general of all of surgery's ethical war," warned of "devastating and mind-boggling consequences" of a loss in court, and questioned why individual ophthalmologists and medical organizations had not reacted more strongly to the threat "of a plane flying overseas with a potential hydrogen bomb ready to explode." Byron also, however, deplored the potential negative consequences for Pallin if he should lose the lawsuit and end up "despised and [] permanently outlawed from the ophthalmic community by his peers." He urged that steps be taken to bring Pallin back into the fold and warned that failure to effect a dignified reconciliation would result in an outcome "similar to the Vietnamese war-no winners and all losers." to outlaw this practice." 79 In 1995, an AMA report on medical procedure patenting concluded that it is unethical for physicians to "seek, secure or enforce patents on medical procedures." 80 The AAO's executive vice president, H. Dunbar Hoskins, spearheaded efforts to lobby Congress against medical procedure patents. 81 The Medical Procedure Patent Coalition, which eventually included the AMA, the American College of Surgeons, and the Association of American Medical Colleges, along with the ophthalmology associations and others, sought legislation that would render medical procedures and diagnostic methods unpatentable. Eventually, after several bills were introduced and debated, the lobbying efforts resulted in the enactment of 35 U.S.C. §287(c) in 1996. Senator Frist, himself a physician, introduced the final version of the bill. 82 In §287(c), the physicians got some, but not all, of what they had wanted, which was to exclude medical procedures from patentable subject matter The proposed ban on medical procedure patents was opposed by the biopharmaceutical industry and by the USPTO. The provision that eventually emerged reflects a compromise. Rather than eliminating medical procedure patents, § 287(c) eliminates remedies, including injunctive relief, against medical practitioners and health care entities only for infringement of pure procedure patents. By eliminating remedies against physicians, the legislation made it pointless to sue them directly for infringing pure medical procedure patents. However, §287(c) preserved the value of lawsuits against third parties for inducing or contributing to physician infringement, by allowing the USPTO to continue issuing medical procedure patents and subjecting medical practitioners to technical liability for infringing them. Moreover, the §287(c) remedy exemption does not apply to all medical procedures. Many claims to medical procedures involving patented devices or drugs fall outside of its scope, as do biotechnology patents.
B. Viewing the Physician Community's Opposition to Medical Procedure Patents through a User Innovation Lens
No doubt, a number of factors have contributed to the changing relationship between physicians and patents. Commentators often attribute the softening of the profession's absolute anti-patent stance to a spiral of increasing healthcare commercialization and decreasing medical professionalism over time. 85 The Pallin v. Singer story does not fit into that picture. During the heyday of enthusiasm for the patent system's potential for medical innovation generally and at a time when the patentability of methods was otherwise expanding, the physician community resoundingly rejected medical procedure patenting. Physicians took this stand despite their support for physician patenting of medical devices. The lens of "user innovation" suggests a possible explanation of the line the physician community has drawn between procedure and device patenting.
Because they are users, physician innovators benefit directly from the norm of sharing medical procedure inventions: it gives them access to the collective inventive output of the community for use in treating their patients. The sharing norm also allows physician innovators to build upon and improve one another's innovations. Of course, physicians, like many other types of user innovators, also compete with one another to some extent and seek rewards for their inventive efforts. This interplay between the drive for credit and the drive for access likely explains why user innovator communities so often eschew the exclusivity and inflexibility of legally-defined intellectual property rights in favor of tailored reputation rewards and sharing norms. 86 Formal IP rights can threaten these norms-based governance regimes. Exclusive IP rights may allow community members to defect from the community's reward system by holding the community up for rewards that are excessive in relation to the credit the community has allocated. If the number of such defections begins to rise, these internal governance mechanisms may be destabilized. 87 User innovator community norms against patenting help to stabilize the reputation-based reward system and associated sharing norms. Of course, doing away entirely with intellectual property rights that provide the tools for defection is an even more effective stabilization mechanism.
The user innovator perspective comports with physician opposition to medical procedure patents. Physicians and other medical caregivers are the primary users of medical procedures and also are likely to be the primary innovators. They have strong common interests in effective patient care, which motivate the community norms of disclosure and sharing. The physician community relies on an internally-governed system of publication credit and other reputational mechanisms for allocating rewards for procedure inventions and thus sees medical procedure patents as unnecessary, cumbersome, and threatening to the sharing norm. Physician opposition to medical procedure patents makes sense as an attempt to protect the medical community's norms-based innovation system.
Medical device innovation is different. Modern medical device innovation generally requires extensive collaboration with commercial firms. Device development often requires expertise in non-medical fields, such as electrical engineering and materials science, and an understanding of manufacturing processes. Device commercialization demands expertise regarding the regulatory approval process. Internal community norms cannot effectively allocate rewards when physician innovators must find their collaborators on the other side of the boundary between industry and the physician community. For medical device inventions, patents provide a shared currency for allocating rewards across community boundaries, while contracts and licenses, rather than norms, govern collaborative relationships.
The Pallin v. Singer story can be read against this user innovator community backdrop. The physician community viewed Pallin as a defector from the anti-patenting norm. Pallin, on the other hand, claimed that he resorted to patent enforcement because the community's reward system failed to give him enough credit for his contributions. Whether or not Pallin was justified in his view, the story highlights the fact that all systems of allocating rewards for invention are imperfect. Reputation systems can turn into old boys' networks that are difficult for outsiders without the right contacts and pedigrees to penetrate. Patent systems impose deadweight loss, while overburdened patent examiners cannot compete with the domain-specific expertise reflected in allocations of credit by expert communities. From society's perspective, whether user innovator community norms are desirable replacements for intellectual property in particular arenas depends on factors such as the way in which community membership is determined, the patent office's level of expertise, the relative transaction costs of the IP-and norms-based systems, and the importance of inventive contributions by outsiders to the community.
VI. The Aftermath
Since its passage, § 287(c) has been invoked only rarely. It has been the subject of only one published opinion, issued in 2008. 88 The provision's dormant status seems surprising in light of the many statutory interpretation issues that would seem to tempt patentees to test the provision's boundaries. Perhaps this situation reflects the law's effectiveness at deterring suits against physicians for infringing medical procedure patents. Or perhaps the main effect of the Pallin v. Singer episode was to clarify and reaffirm the norm against medical procedure patenting. That norm, rather than the technicalities of § 287(c)'s language, sets the boundary of acceptable physician behavior.
While the scope of § 287(c)'s exemption for suits against physicians has not been tested, the issue of medical procedure patenting has come to the fore once again in cases, such as Mayo v. Prometheus, 89 involving secondary liability premised on physician infringement of medical diagnostic method claims. The patentees in these cases have sued the laboratories that measure metabolite blood levels, sequence and interpret DNA samples, and so forth. Physicians have argued that these patents cover unpatentable subject matter. 90 Many of their arguments about the dangers such patents pose to the medical community are similar to those made by physicians during the Pallin v. Singer controversy. As both medical science and medical practice continue to evolve, the boundary between the realm of community-based user innovation norms and the patent system will no doubt continue to be contested. In medical innovation, intellectual property truly does live "at the edge."
